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Abstract 
 
Unlike competitive higher education systems, non-competitive systems show relatively 
uniform distributions of top professors and low performers among universities. In this 
study, we examine the impact of unproductive and top faculty members on overall 
research performance of the university they belong to. Furthermore, we analyze the 
potential relationship between research productivity of a university and the indexes of 
concentration of unproductive and top professors. Research performance is evaluated 
using a bibliometric approach, through publications indexed on the Web of Science 
between 2004 and 2008. The set analyzed consists of all Italian universities active in the 
hard sciences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
National systems of higher education differ in intensity of competition among 
universities due to general differences in funding mechanisms, levels of institutional 
autonomy, and culture. The “Anglo-Saxon” tradition, particularly in the United States, 
has led to competitive university systems, with emergence of world-class research-
intensive universities and notable inequality in performance among institutions. In the 
area of research performance, such levels of heterogeneity are confirmed by relatively 
high values of the Gini concentration index, although referred to the gross performance 
indicator of publications per researcher (Halffman and Leydesdorff, 2010). In 
competitive systems, in fact, there is a concentration of top professors in elite 
universities and low performers in the lower prestige institutions. 
In Northern Europe, the development of New Public Management in the academic 
sector, with emphasis on quasi-market competition, efficiency and performance audit 
practices, will likely lead to an overall increase in performance, together with greater 
differentiation among universities. Expectations are also that, in the coming years, 
government funding will be distributed in an increasingly less uniform manner (Horta et 
al., 2008). In southern Europe, higher education systems are generally composed of 
public universities with relatively low autonomy, and are often characterized by weak 
overall performance with little differentiation among institutions (Van der Ploeg and 
Veugelers, 2008). In Italy, as a case in point, the variability of research productivity 
among universities (standardized citations per researcher in the same field) results as 
being much lower than that within individual institutions (Abramo et al., 2012a). 
Essentially, both top and bottom performing professors are found in the same 
universities. 
In a growing number of countries, universities are ever more subject to research 
performance evaluations and ranking assessments (Osterloh and Frey, 2008; 
Leydesdorff, 2008; Hicks, 2011). However, when national research assessment 
exercises inform the allocation of public funds to individual universities in non-
competitive, undifferentiated systems, the paradox could develop that low performing 
professors in higher-performing universities would receive more funds than higher 
performers in low-performing universities. In this work we examine the impact of 
unproductive2 faculty members in the classification of individual universities in 
undifferentiated systems, comparing the research productivity rankings of universities 
both including and excluding unproductive professors from the calculations. For each 
university, we also measure the levels of concentration of unproductive and top 
professors, to verify any negative correlation. Finally, we attempt to identify a relation 
between research productivity of a university and indexes of concentration of 
unproductive and of top professors. The analyses refer to the Italian university system, 
which offers a good example of scarce differentiation in research productivity. 
In the next section we describe the principle characteristics of the higher education 
system seen in Italy. In Section 3 we explain the dataset and methodology for the 
indicators of productivity used in the analysis. Section 4 provides the results of the 
analysis and the final section offers the study conclusions and the authors’ 
considerations. 
 
                                                 
2 Unproductive refers to the research activity of faculty members. We define a professor unproductive if 
his research productivity, as defined in section 3, is nil. 
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2. The Italian higher education system 
 
The Italian Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) officially 
recognizes a total of 96 universities, with authority to issue legally-recognized degrees. 
Twenty-nine of these are very small private special-focus universities, of which 13 offer 
only e-learning. Sixty-seven are public and generally multi-disciplinary universities, 
scattered throughout the nation, some having a number of branches in smaller cities. Six 
of them are Scuole Superiori (Schools for Higher Studies), specifically devoted to 
highly talented students, with very small faculties and tightly limited enrollment 
numbers per degree program. In Italy, 94.9% of faculty are employed in public 
universities (0.5% in Scuole Superiori) and 5.1% are in private universities. 
The Italian higher education system is a long-standing, classic example of a public 
and highly centralized governance structure, with low levels of autonomy at the 
university level and a very strong role played by the central state. To date, the most 
significant intervention for liberalization has been Law 168 of 1989, intended to grant 
increased autonomy and responsibilities to the universities. In particular, Articles 6 and 
7 of this law are intended to enact Article 37 of the national Constitution, establishing 
the fundamentals of university autonomy in teaching, research, financing and 
accounting, and directing that individual institutions appropriately establish an 
autonomous organizational framework including their own charters and regulations. 
Law 537 (Article 5) of 1993 and Decree 168 of 1996 introduced substantial changes in 
central financing for universities, specifically in relation to overall amounts, re-
equilibration among institutions, freedom and responsibility in allocating expenses, 
involvement in fund-raising, and freedom to apply tuition fees provided that these do 
not exceed 20% of total government funding. Law 537 had two objectives: to increase 
university involvement in overall decision-making relating to use of resources, and to 
encourage individual institutions to operate on the market and reach their own economic 
and financial equilibrium. 
In keeping with the Humboldt model, there are no “teaching-only” universities in 
Italy, as all professors are required to carry out both research and teaching. National 
regulations establish that each faculty member must allocate a minimum of 350 hours 
per year to teaching. At the close of 2011, there were around 59,000 faculty members in 
Italy (full, associate and assistant professors) and a roughly equal number of technical-
administrative staff. All new personnel enter the university system through public 
examinations and career advancement can only proceed by further public examinations. 
Salaries are regulated at the centralized level and are calculated according to role 
(administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example: assistant, 
associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends on merit: 
salaries increase annually according to rules set by government. Moreover, as in all 
Italian public administration, dismissal of an employee for lack of productivity is 
unheard of. 
The whole of these conditions create an environment and a culture that are 
completely non-competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic 
behaviors that are dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the higher education 
system. The overall result is a system of universities that are almost completely 
undifferentiated for quality and prestige, with the exception of the tiny Scuole Superiori 
and a very small number of the private special-focus universities. The system is thus 
unable to attract significant foreign faculty or students. The numbers are negligible: 
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foreign students are 3% of the total, compared to the OECD average of 8.5%, and only 
2.3% of actual graduates are foreigners; only 1.8% of research staff are foreign 
nationals. This is a system where every university has some share of top professors, 
flanked by another share of absolute non-producers. Over the 2004-2008 period, 6,640 
(16.8%) of the 39,512 hard sciences professors did not publish any scientific articles in 
the journals indexed by the Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science (WoS). Another 3,070 
professors (7.8%) did achieve publication, but their work was never cited. This means 
that 9,710 individuals (24.6%) had no impact on scientific progress. An almost equal 
23.0% of professors alone produced 77% of the overall scientific advancement. The 
problem is that this 23% of faculty is not concentrated in a limited number of 
universities, but is instead dispersed more or less uniformly among all Italian 
universities, along with the unproductive ones, so that no single institution reaches the 
critical mass of excellence necessary to develop as an elite university and compete at the 
international level (Abramo et al., 2012a). Given the situation, it can be no surprise that 
no Italian university ranks above 150th position in any of the yearly world universities 
rankings (THES, 2012; SJTU, 2011; QS, 2011). 
 
 
3. Productivity rankings at individual and university levels: methodology and 
dataset 
 
Research activity is a production process in which the inputs consist of human, 
tangible (scientific instruments, materials, etc.) and intangible (accumulated knowledge, 
social networks, etc.) resources, and where outputs have a complex character of both 
tangible nature (publications, patents, conference presentations, databases, protocols, 
etc.) and intangible nature (tacit knowledge, consulting activity, etc.). The new-
knowledge production function has therefore a multi-input and multi-output character. 
The principal efficiency indicator of any production system is labor productivity. To 
calculate it one needs adopt a few simplifications and assumptions. It has been shown 
(Moed, 2005) that in the hard sciences, including life sciences, the prevalent form of 
codification of research output is the publication in scientific journals. As a proxy of 
total output in this work we consider only publications (articles, article reviews, and 
proceeding papers) indexed in the WoS. The other forms of output which we neglect are 
often followed by publications that describe their content in the scientific arena, so the 
analysis of publications alone actually avoids a potential double counting. 
When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the production factors 
available to each professor then one should normalize by them. Unfortunately relevant 
data are not available at individual level in Italy. The first assumption then is that 
resources available to professors within the same field of observation are the same. The 
second assumption is that the hours devoted to research are more or less the same for all 
professors. In Italy the above assumptions are acceptable, because in the period of 
observation core government funding was input oriented, and distributed to satisfy the 
resource needs of each and every university in function of their size and activities. 
Furthermore, the hours that each professor has to devote to teaching are established by 
national regulations and the same for all. 
Research projects frequently involve a team of researchers, which shows in co-
authorship of publications. Productivity measures then need to account for the fractional 
contributions of professors to their outputs. In the life science, the position of co-authors 
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in the list reflects the relative contribution to the project and needs to be weighted 
accordingly. Furthermore, because the intensity of publications varies across fields 
(Abramo et al., 2008), in order to avoid distortions in productivity rankings, one must 
compare researchers within the same field. A prerequisite of any research performance 
assessment free of distortions is then a classification of each researcher in one and only 
one field. In the Italian university system all professors are classified in one field. To our 
knowledge, this feature of the Italian higher education system is unique in the world. In 
the hard sciences, there are 205 such fields (named scientific disciplinary sectors, 
SDSs3), grouped into nine disciplines (named university disciplinary areas, UDAs4). 
Since it has been demonstrated that productivity of full, associate and assistant 
professors is different (Abramo et al., 2011a), their distribution is not uniform across 
universities, and academic rank determines differentiation in stipends, we differentiate 
performance rankings by academic rank. 
A very gross way to calculate the average yearly labor research productivity is to 
simply measure the weighted fractional count of publications per researcher in the 
period of observation and divide it for the full time equivalent of work in the period. A 
more sophisticated way to calculate productivity recognizes the fact that publications, 
embedding the new knowledge produced, have different values. Their value depends on 
their impact on scientific advancements. As proxy of impact bibliometricians adopt the 
number of citations for the researchers’ publications. 
However, comparing researchers’ performance by field and academic rank is not 
enough to avoid distortions in rankings. In fact citation behavior too varies across fields, 
and it has been shown that it is not unlikely that researchers belonging to a particular 
scientific field may also publish outside that field (a typical example is statisticians, 
who may apply theory to medicine, physics, social sciences, etc.). For this reason we 
standardize the citations for each publication accumulated at June 30, 2009 with respect 
to the median5 for the distribution of citations for all the Italian publications of the same 
year and the same subject category6. 
In formulae, the average yearly productivity at the individual level, p is the 
following: 
 
 
Where: 
t = number of years of work of the researcher in the period of observation 
N = number of publications of the researcher in the period of observation. 
 = citations received by publication i; 
 = median of the distribution of citations received for all Italian cited-only 
                                                 
3 The complete list is accessible on http://attiministeriali.miur.it/UserFiles/115.htm 
4 Mathematics and computer sciences; physics; chemistry; earth sciences; biology; medicine; agricultural 
and veterinary sciences; civil engineering; industrial and information engineering. 
5 As frequently observed in literature (Lundberg, 2007), standardization of citations with respect to 
median value rather than to the average is justified by the fact that distribution of citations is highly 
skewed in almost all disciplines. 
6 The subject category of a publication corresponds to that of the journal where it is published. For 
publications in multidisciplinary journals the scaling factor is calculated as a weighted average of the 
standardized values for each subject category. 
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publications of the same year and subject category of publication i; 
 = co-authors of publication i 
In the life sciences, widespread practice is for the authors to indicate the various 
contributions to the published research by the positioning of the names in the authors 
list. For life sciences then, when the number of co-authors is higher than two, different 
weights are given to each co-author according to his/her position in the list and the 
character of the co-authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural). If first and last authors 
belong to the same university, 40% of citations are attributed to each of them; the 
remaining 20% are divided among all other authors. If the first two and last two authors 
belong to different universities, 30% of citations are attributed to first and last authors; 
15% of citations are attributed to second and last author but one; the remaining 10% are 
divided among all others7. 
Based on the value of p we obtain, for each SDS, a ranking list expressed in 
percentiles and differentiated by academic rank. Thus the performance of each professor 
is calculated in each SDS for each academic rank and expressed on a percentile scale of 
0-100 (worst to best) for comparison with the performance of all Italian colleagues of 
the same academic rank and SDS; or as the ratio to the average performance of all 
Italian colleagues of the same academic rank and SDS. We can exclude, for the Italian 
case, that productivity ranking lists may be distorted by variable returns to scale, due to 
different sizes of universities (Abramo et al., 2012b). 
Data on faculty of each university and their SDS classification are extracted from the 
database on Italian university personnel, maintained by the MIUR. The bibliometric 
dataset used to measure p is extracted from the Italian Observatory of Public Research 
(ORP), a database developed and maintained by the authors and derived under license 
from the WoS. Beginning from the raw data of the WoS, and applying a complex 
algorithm for reconciliation of the author’s affiliation and disambiguation of the true 
identity of the authors, each publication (article, article review and conference 
proceeding) is attributed to the university professor or professors that produced it 
(D’Angelo et al., 2011). Thanks to this algorithm, we can produce rankings of research 
productivity at the individual level, on a national scale. 
Average yearly productivity P of an entire university is given by sum of the 
individuals’ productivities, each normalized to the average per academic rank in the 
SDS, divided by the total number of professors, thus: 
 
P =  [2] 
 
Where: 
N = number of researchers at the university 
n = number of SDSs where the university is active 
p = researcher productivity 
Ap = national average of researcher productivity 
j indicates the academic rank 
k indicates the SDS 
 
                                                 
7 The weighting values were assigned following advice from Italian professors in the life sciences. The 
values could be changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
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To calculate productivity net of unproductive professors, the formula denominator 
then excludes all professors with nil productivity value over the five years under 
examination (N_prod), thus: 
 
P(1) =  [3] 
 
On the basis of the count of professors with nil productivity values, we calculate the 
index of concentration for unproductive professors, NR, for every university. Since the 
concentration of unproductive professors varies among SDSs and academic ranks, and 
the distribution of SDSs and their professors is not uniform among universities, we 
apply the following formula to avoid distortion: 
 
NR =  [4] 
 
Where: 
N = total number of professors at the university 
%IS = ratio of unproductive professors to total professors in the SDS 
%AIS = national average ratio of unproductive professors to total professors in the SDS 
k indicates the SDS 
 
Finally, we calculate the index of concentration of top professors TR, representing 
the number of professors classified in the top 20%8 in Italy, for research productivity in 
their SDS and for their academic rank, relative to the total professors at the university, 
thus: 
 
TR=  [5] 
 
Table 1 lists the indicators described above with the acronyms that are used in the 
remainder of the article. 
 
Indicator Formula Description 
P [2] Total productivity of the university  
P(1) [3] Total productivity of the university, net of unproductive professors 
NR [4] Index of concentration of unproductive professors per university 
TR [5] Index of concentration of top 20% professors per university  
Table 1: Summary of indicators used for the analysis 
 
 
                                                 
8 The threshold value could be changed according to preferences. The 20% value is suggested here 
because the analysis is carried out at the SDS level, and in a few of them the number of professors is not 
very high. 
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3. Results and analysis 
 
3.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
To render WoS-indexed publications a more robust proxy of overall output of a 
professor, the field of observation is limited to those SDSs where at least 50% of the 
professors produced at least one publication in the period 2004-2008. There are 184 
such SDSs. We further exclude the universities with less than five professors in any 
specific SDS considered. The field of analysis is thus limited to 39,477 professors from 
65 of the total 89 Italian universities. 
As a first step, we calculate the descriptive statistics for the distributions of 
university performance indicators (Table 2). 
 
 P P(1) NR TR 
Observations 65 65 65 65 
Mean 1.066 1.393 0.981 0.214 
Std dev. 0.419 0.422 0.301 0.084 
Minimum 0.278 0.784 0.187 0.054 
Maximum 2.601 2.680 1.865 0.548 
Coeff. of variation 39.274 30.289 30.699 39.143 
First quartile 0.772 1.108 0.779 0.161 
Median 1.014 1.288 0.951 0.204 
Third quartile 1.230 1.555 1.174 0.251 
Skewness 1.575 1.440 0.297 1.411 
Gini coefficient 0.198 0.150 0.170 0.202 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for indicators used for the analysis 
 
The first two columns show the descriptive statistics for the overall university 
productivity P and productivity excluding unproductive professors, P(1). With 
unproductive professors excluded, we observe that the performance distribution of the 
universities tends to be slightly less dispersed around an average value of productivity 
that is obviously higher, increasing from 1066 to 1.393. With the increased average 
value there is actually a slight decrease in the coefficient of variation. The Gini 
coefficient also decreases, going from 0.198 to 1.150. 
This slight drop in dispersion shows that the unproductive professors are found in a 
quite uniform manner in almost all universities. In a competitive system we probably 
would witness a drastic drop in the dispersion of performance between universities, 
since the unproductive professors would be concentrated in a subgroup of institutions. 
Avoiding their inclusion in the productivity measure would permit their universities to 
notably reduce their performance gap with the best universities. 
The box plot in Figure 1 shows the comparison between the two scenarios created. 
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Figure 1: Comparison between box plots for distributions of university productivity, with and without 
unproductive professors 
 
Among the outliers, the first three universities maintain the first three positions 
under both scenarios since the share of unproductive professors is so low that it only 
weakly influences performance. 
Overall, excluding the unproductive professors leads to 35 out of 65 universities 
experiencing an increase in productivity of between 25 and 50% (Figure 2), while 23 
show an increase of between 0 and 25%. 
There are also three anomalous cases: one university experiences a productivity 
increase of between 80 and 100%, another an increase between 100 and 120%, and a 
third experiences an increase of an extreme 350%, being specialized in a research area 
where the significance of bibliometric analysis is at the limit and thus performance is 
extremely sensitive to the presence or exclusion of the unproductive professors. 
In comparing the P and P(1) ranking lists we observe variations in rank for the 
individual universities. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the distribution of 
these variations, as absolute and real values. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of percentage increase of performance from P to P(1) 
 
Statistics Absolute variations Real value variations 
No variations 6 6 
Variations 59 59 
Average 5.323 0 
Median 3 -1 
Skewness 2.341 1.869 
Std dev. 5.748 8.436 
Minimum 0 -15 
Maximum 31 +31 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of absolute and real value variations between rankings by P and by P(1) 
 
This analysis shows that 59 out of 65 universities change at least one position. An 
individual university experiences an average absolute rank variation of 5.3 positions, 
which is greater than that median variation, at 3. For most universities (about 40 out of 
65), the variation in rank is between 0 and 4 positions. The average value is particularly 
influenced by two universities that experience a jump of more than 25 positions in rank 
and thus determine the strong positive asymmetry (skewness = 2.341) of the absolute 
variations in rank. 
Table 3, column 3 presents the statistics on the variations in rank: this permits us to 
distinguish the negative from the positive variations. Naturally the distribution of these 
variations has an average value of nil, since the negative and positive shifts compensate. 
Still, we note that the maximum positive value of such variations is 31 positions, which 
is much more than the largest negative shift, at -15, in this case determining a less 
marked positive asymmetry (skewness=1.869.). In general, the ranks based on the two 
forms of productivity are quite similar, with the Spearman correlation value being 
+0.898 (p-value<0.01). 
We next classify the universities in four groups based on their P and P(1) values (a 
common method of applying national research assessment results). We assign values of 
4, 3, 2 and 1 corresponding to the first, second, third and fourth quartiles for 
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productivity value. Then we calculate the distributions of the shifts in quartile that a 
university experiences in moving from ranking by P to that net of unproductive 
professors, by P(1) (Table 4). 
 
 
 
P(1) 
 
 
4 3 2 1 
P 
4 13 3 0 0 
3 3 8 5 0 
2 0 5 8 3 
1 0 0 3 14 
Table 4: Analysis of changes in quartile between rankings by P and by P(1) 
 
No university makes a shift of more than one quartile, thus confirming the similarity 
between the two ranking lists. Still, if we hypothesize a university financing system in 
Italy that resembles that of the UK’s, where funds are allocated only to universities that 
occupy the top two performance quartiles as assigned by research assessment exercises, 
we would see that five universities that would not receive funds on account of 
unproductive professors, would now receive funds with the removal of unproductive 
professors in considering their productivity. 
Returning to Table 2, the fourth and fifth columns refer to the concentration of 
unproductive and top professors in the 65 Italian universities. As seen in Figure 3, the 
distribution of the index of unproductive professors (NR) is more concentrated around 
its median value (0.981) than the distribution of the tops professor index (TR), which is 
more asymmetric to the right; 16 universities out of 65 have a TR value between 15% 
and 20%, 17 have a value between 20% and 25% , and finally 6 universities (9%) have 
a TR concentration greater than 30%, establishing the right tail of the distribution. 
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Figure 3: Distributions of NR and TR among 65 Italian universities 
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From this first descriptive analysis we see that unproductive professors are 
distributed quite equally among Italian universities, while the concentration of top 
professors is more dispersed. With removal of their unproductive professors, some 
universities experience significant increases in productivity, but these do not translate 
into particularly evident shifts in rank, and are never more than a one quartile shift. 
Observing these various distributions, in the next section we analyze the potential 
relationship between overall productivity of a university and its rates of unproductive 
and top professors. 
 
 
3.2. Relationship between university productivity and the concentrations of top 
and unproductive professors 
 
To evaluate the relationship between the overall productivity of a university and the 
concentrations of top and unproductive professors, we first examine the correlations 
between the indicators described above (Table 5). 
 
 P TR NR 
P 1.000   
TR 0.953* 1.000  
NR -0.720* -0.662* 1.000 
Table 5: Spearman correlation matrix of variables for regression analysis 
* p-value < 0.01 
 
The Spearman correlation matrix shows that concentration of top professors (TR) is 
negatively correlated (Spearman ρ= -0.662) with that of unproductive professors (NR). 
In spite of there being a quite uniform distribution of unproductive and top professors 
and within Italian universities, the ranking lists derived from the TR and NR indicators 
are inversely correlated: universities that place high in the classification for TR tend to 
occupy lower positions in the classification for NR, and vice versa, The anomalous 
cases, different than this tendency, are the universities situated in the upper right and 
lower left quadrants in Figure 4. The most interesting cases, indicated with larger 
triangles, are two universities that show totally superimposed values, notably lower than 
the median, for NR and TR; a third university that shows values notably higher than the 
median for both indicators, and finally a fourth university that has the highest 
concentration of top professors, but an NR value around the median. 
Table 5 also shows that both the TR and NR indicators are strongly and consistently 
correlated with productivity P: TR is positively correlated (Spearman ρ= +0.953), while 
NR is negatively correlated (Spearman ρ= -0.720). The right side of Figure 5 shows the 
scatter plot for correlation between productivity and concentration of top professors. We 
observe that the relationship is linear, with particular concentration of universities 
around the median of P (1.014). The left side of the same figure correlates productivity 
and concentration of unproductive professors: in this case the linear relationship is less 
evident and the values are more dispersed. 
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of NR versus TR: references lines are the medians of the distributions for each 
variable; triangles indicate universities that stand out from the general trend line 
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Figure 5: Scatter plots of indices of unproductive (NR) and top (TR) professors vs university 
productivity (P) 
 
Given these results, we conclude our analyses by attempting a simple regression 
model to evaluate the effect of unproductive and top professors on the overall 
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productivity of the university (P). To do this, we create a dummy variable to distinguish 
public universities (dummy=1) from private universities (dummy=0). The model results 
are shown in Table 6. 
 
Predictor Coeff. SE Coeff. t p-value 95% Conf. Interval Beta VIF 
Constant 0.518 0.110 4.72 0.000 0.298 0.737   
NR -0.203 0.060 -3.44 0.001 -0.320 -0.848 -0.108 1.68 
TR100 0.042 0.002 19.68 0.000 0.038 0.046 0.843 1.72 
Dummy -0.167 0.051 -3.24 0.002 -0.271 -0.064 -0.145 1.03 
Post estimation statistics Value p-value    
R squared 0.935      
R squared (adjusted) 0.932      
F test 292.25 0.000     
Normality test of residuals* 0.771 0.043     
Table 6: Linear regression analysis with 65 universities 
*Anderson-Darling test of normality 
 
The regression equation obtained is: 
 
 + ε. 
 
where the value of TR has been multiplied by 100. The regression coefficients are 
all jointly significant (F test=292.25 with a p-value of 0.000). The VIF test confirms the 
absence of multi-collinearity, which would be expected given the value of near 0.7 for 
correlation of TR with NR. Normality test of errors has a p-value around 5% (0.043), 
showing uncertainty regarding the effective normality of the regression residues. Still, 
the model explains more than 90% of total variance (R squared=0.935), which indicates 
a good fit. 
For every unit increase in TR percentage, a 0.042 unit increase in global 
performance P is predicted, holding the NR constant; while for every unit increase in 
NR, a -0.203 unit decrease in global performance P is predicted. With the different units 
of measure for TR, expressed as a percentage, and NR, which is a non-dimensional 
indicator, it is naturally impossible to directly compare the two regression coefficients 
and give an appropriate interpretation of a unit increase in the NR variable. For this 
reason, we also calculate the beta standardized coefficients, which show that a 
percentage increase in TR has a higher effect on productivity than an equal decrease in 
NR. 
The constant variable is 0.518 when the university is private, 0.351 when public; 
thus when a university (either public or private) does not have either top or 
unproductive professors it will place in the last quartile for performance P, with upper 
limit at 0.772. Meanwhile, for a public university with an unproductive professors index 
value equal to 1, the minimum concentration of top professors to achieve productivity 
greater than the median is 21%, and a concentration of 26% would place the university 
in the top performance quartile (lower limit 1.230). 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
In competitive higher education systems, such as “Anglo-Saxon” examples, we 
witness the concentration of top professors in elite universities and low performers in 
lower tier universities. In non-competitive higher education systems, such as the one in 
Italy, the distribution of both top and low performers is relatively uniform among 
universities, such that the variability of research performance is much higher within 
universities than between universities (Abramo et al., 2012a). In these systems, the 
adoption of selective funding policies based on the results of national research 
assessment exercises, could result as inequitable and counter-productive as 
demonstrated by Abramo et al. (2011b). In fact, top performers in low-tier universities 
could receive fewer funds than low performers who happen to be employed in high-tier 
universities. In Italy, with the particular context strongly structured against forced 
departure from public employment (it is unheard of to suspend tenure for low 
productivity), and with an absence of incentive systems, where faculty salaries are 
independent of productivity and linked only to academic rank and seniority, the 
situation is one where low-tier universities can only hope to improve their performance 
over the long term, through generational change. However the “selective” reduction of 
government funding could negate even this hope and also undermine the basic welfare 
principle of the Italian academic system: all students must be guaranteed opportunity of 
access to equal quality university education, independent of personal standing or 
geographic location. In such contexts, it would thus be preferable to allocate selective 
government funding directly to individual professors. In this regard, the difficulty of 
implementing performance measurement systems robust and reliable at individual level 
cannot be invoked for not to proceed in this direction. Recent advancements in 
bibliometric techniques, at least in the hard sciences, make possible the development of 
effective decision support systems based on large-scale measurement of bibliometric 
performance of individual researchers, offered as an aid for resource allocation and 
strategic planning in public research organizations (Abramo and D’Angelo, 2011). 
In this study we have demonstrated that the possibility of calculating university 
performance net of unproductive professors, for potential allocation of resources based 
on such a ranking list, would not lead to notable variations in rank. Rather it is the top 
performers who have a more relevant impact on university performance. This leads to 
two fundamental recommendations, which sound obvious in efficient systems: a) for the 
policy maker, to consider funding allocations based on individual level rankings rather 
than on university rankings, in order to support maximal productivity among the 
research community; b) for universities, to pay particular attention to recruitment. 
Unfortunately, Italian legislation, for the moment, still requires that all faculty 
employment take place through national competition exams, often invalidated by 
diffuse practices of favoritism. In such non-competitive systems, it could be considered 
a more daring policy aimed at encouraging the budding of few spin-off universities 
made of  the top scientists from the incumbents. These universities would by nature be 
highly immune to the favoritism virus and much more inclined to adopt practical and 
principled strategies, typical of those in competitive systems.  
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